

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWEORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: KITANO, Kenzo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am KITANO, Kenzo, an ex-Lieutenant-General, aged 59, and presently living at No. 29, Goban-cho, HIKONE City.
2. I held the post of Chief of Staff of the Korean Army as a major-general from early in March, 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA) to September, 1939 (the 14th year of SHOWA). The commander of the Army at that time was General KOISO, until July 15, 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA), when he was succeeded by General N. KAMURA.
3. As for Commander OSAO's intentions and actions prior to the outbreak of the CHINKUFENG Incident, I will depose as follows:
A. The Commander of the Korean Army in 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA) had no operational duties but was only charged with the

duty of defending Korea. He was not invested with any war-time duties. He was therefore, as it were, a commander of a caretaker army.

As regards the 2 divisions in Korea, the command of the Army Commander was confined to the defence of Korea and, so far as the duty of wartime operations was concerned, the Chief of the General Staff was directly in charge. At the time of the CHANGKUFENG Incident, the 20th Division was in North China, so the only field division in Korea was the 19th Division.

B. Such being the case, the troops under its command were constantly required to absolutely keep from exciting the Soviet Army. Especially since the China Incident was then in progress,

were they warned to be extremely cautious as any dispute outbreak with the Soviet Union would be an obstacle in carrying out the policy of the central authorities towards China.

Again the likes of watch-post line of our border guards were laid, within our territory of defence back from the frontier line in many places. On the occasion of inspections or observations, they were done at the spot of the watch-post line or at the headquarters of units, never going close to the frontier line. Such being the case, it was the principle for all troops from the Army Commander down to do their utmost not to excite the Soviet. Therefore, such an attempt as to invade Soviet territory was quite out of the question and was impossible from the standpoint of military strength.

C. Just before the outbreak of the CHANGKUFENG Incident in July, 1938 (the 13th year of SHO-A), I was in TOKYO to attend the conference of the chiefs of staff, and was completely ignorant of any changes in the situation of the Soviet Army on the frontier with the central authorities at TOKYO also, who naturally, never expected such a border dispute, gave neither orders instructions nor warning whatsoever concerning this during my stay in TOKYO.

As the conference concluded I left TOKYO and returned to SEOUL on July 15. For the first time I learned that the situation of the Soviet troops in the vicinity of CHANGKUFENG had changed, that the Commander of the 19th Division had applied for concentrating its main force on the bank of the TUMEN River to secure the complete defense of Korea, and that the Army Commander was asking the central Army authorities for instructions.

Telegraphic instructions from the Central Authorities in reply to the above application reached the Army Commander on July 16. Its gist was "...against the Soviet troops in the vicinity of CHANGKUFENG, should they cross the frontier into our territory, the troops in Korea under your command, as occasion demands, may be concentrated to the vicinity of the frontier." On the other hand Army Commander KOISO on the previous day, in other words July 15, had been transferred and attached to

General Staff Headquarters.

I remember, as a result, I presented the telegraphic instructions from the Central Authorities to General NAKAMURA, Kotaro, the succeeding Army Commander, who arrived at SEOUL on July 17, and asked the new commander for necessary instructions and measures were made for the troops under his command.

As stated above, Korean Army orders to units of part of the 20th Division relative to the Soviet-Manchurian frontier dispute were given by General NAKAMURA, the new Army Commander, and had nothing to do with General KOISO.

On this 4th day of Sept., 1947

At Tokyo

Deponent: /s/ KITANO, Kenzo (seal)

I, TANAKA, Kazuya, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date,

at the same place.

Witness: /s/ TAKAGI, Kazuya (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KITANO, Kenzo (seal)